Bill Jeffrey: “Northern Ireland policing reform 25 years on.”

Bill Jeffrey was Political Director in the Northern Ireland Office, 1997–2002.

When I arrived in the Northern Ireland Office towards the end of 1997 to take over as Political Director, the all-party talks under Senator Mitchell were in full flow, in the run-up to the April 1998 deadline which the Senator had set for agreement. Much of what became the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement existed in draft. The ambition was for a comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues which had bedevilled earlier attempts to bring lasting peace to Northern Ireland.

To a remarkable extent, the ambition to be comprehensive was fulfilled. The Agreement didn’t settle the constitutional position of Northern Ireland for all time, but it made important constitutional changes in both Ireland and the UK and established the principle of consent. It defined a new institutional framework for government in Northern Ireland and the conduct of North-South and East-West relations, and addressed a wide range of other issues, including the entrenchment of human rights safeguards and equality and security normalisation.

In some areas, the negotiations had led to relatively detailed conclusions. The new institutions are well-described, even if actually implementing them has proved challenging. But in others it simply wasn’t realistic to progress the discussion beyond the establishment of broad principles.

Probably the best example of this is policing.  There was wide recognition that police reform had to be an essential element of any viable way forward, but the sheer sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved meant that it was never likely that the Agreement reached on Good Friday 1998 would contain a detailed blueprint for a fresh start. If I remember rightly, the policing section of the final Agreement was drafted only in the final days of negotiations, after the two Prime Ministers became involved. Even so, it makes a powerful, high-level case for change, and sets out the criteria which future policing arrangements and structures should fulfil. These became the starting point for the work of the Patten Commission. Crucially, the Agreement also included agreed terms of reference for the Commission, which might otherwise have taken longer to settle.

I have set out the wider context of the Agreement in a little detail to make one point about the subsequent process of implementing the Patten recommendations, which was by no means straightforward. When the Agreement was reached, the expectation was that the new political institutions would be established and operating by the time the Patten Report was received. In fact, as any reader of these reflections will know very well, although the Northern Ireland Assembly was elected and established in good time, the establishment of a stable Executive was inhibited, and over a long period prevented, by the long-running dispute over the decommissioning of IRA weapons.

As a consequence, when Patten reported in September 1999, there had already been three unsuccessful attempts to establish the institutions, and the fourth (the Mitchell review) was about to begin. Negotiations among the parties and the British and Irish Governments on the two issues – unblocking the establishment of the institutions and implementing the policing reforms – became interconnected in a way that hadn’t been envisaged when the Agreement was reached.

The fact that the Patten Report was being decided on, legislated for and implemented while the devolution/decommissioning wrangle continued probably made both negotiations harder. The UUP was already feeling the impact of disenchantment with aspects of the Agreement, including the prisoner release scheme and the failure to establish the Executive. They felt strongly that the Patten Report and the Government’s initial response to it undervalued the historic role of the RUC and provided too little continuity with the past or recognition of the sacrifices made. The SDLP and Sinn Fein were mainly concerned that the Patten Report should be implemented in full, and suspicious that the UK Government would yield to Unionist pressure to dilute it. For the SDLP in particular, it was a touchstone issue.

The Ministers whom I served over that period therefore had a difficult course to chart. They were fully committed to the implementation of Patten, and the creation of a Service which was human rights compliant, representative of the whole community and commanded the confidence of all, but also keenly aware of the sacrifices made by the RUC over many years of conflict, and the sense of loss which the changes brought among many in the Unionist community. Although, as in all aspects of the political process at that time, the relationship with the Irish Government was close and constructive, the main responsibility for bringing forward the necessary legislation, and planning and managing implementation in an even-handed way, fell to the UK Government.   

What is striking, looking back on it, is that the most vigorously contested aspects of implementation were essentially symbolic – the title of the new Service, its symbols, and the means by which the sacrifices and contribution of the RUC could be acknowledged in the new structures. The detail of these structures, on which future effectiveness depended, received less attention.

This was probably inevitable. Symbolism matters, perhaps more in Northern Ireland than elsewhere. Of all the issues which the 1998 Agreement sought to resolve, policing was arguably the most divisive and emotionally charged. But over the ensuing 25 years what has mattered more has been the robustness of the arrangements recommended by the Patten Commission, the wisdom of the political parties in committing to the Policing Board as a means of holding the new Service to account, and the skill and commitment of a succession of Chief Constables and the dedicated officers under their command.

My direct involvement in these matters ended towards the end of 2002, and I left Government service in 2010. Since then, as Chair of the UK Police Foundation for 13 years, I saw how influential the PSNI has become within the wider UK policing community, and indeed with the Garda Siochana; and internationally, I can vouch for the fact that the level of interest in the Northern Ireland experience of police reform remains high. I don’t live in Northern Ireland, so the ultimate judgement of effectiveness is not one I’m well placed to make. As an interested bystander, my sense is that, perhaps inevitably, it hasn’t always been plain sailing. But the fact that the most recent public confidence levels enjoyed by the PSNI as reported by the Policing Board would be the envy of most police forces in the democratic world suggests that the foundations on which the Service has been built are sound. 

My work with the Police Foundation has also brought home to me how much the world has changed in these 25 years, and particularly in recent times. The police now face different and more complex challenges than their predecessors. Expectations of them are high, sometimes unrealistically so. Police leaders are the first to understand this, and there is a lively debate going Uon about the implications. The PSNI is well placed to contribute to that debate.

Northern Ireland too has changed, largely for the better. Some of the challenges the PSNI faces are still specific to the local context. But the impact of social change, much of it technology driven, knows no boundaries. As others have commented, this may be the right moment to start thinking about the next 25 years.


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