Eamonn McKee, “Policing the peace: Thirty years before and after the Good Friday Agreement.”

Eamonn McKee is a former senior official with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.

There is a still image from archive footage of a tall, senior RUC officer, leaning forward but turned to face the camera behind him. There is something terrible and unfathomable about his expression. RUC County Inspector William Meharg is leading an attack on civil rights marchers. It is Derry, October 5th 1968.

The civil rights march was led by Republican Labour Westminster MP Gerry Fitt, Nationalist Party leader, Stormont MP and leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition Eddie McAteer, and activist Elizabeth Sinclair, secretary of the Belfast and District Trades Union Council since 1947.  Civil rights champion Anne Kerr MP, her husband Russell Kerr MP, and John Ryan MP had travelled from Westminster to Derry at Fitt’s request. McAteer, the patient and pacifist constitutionalist, had overcome his reservations about the civil rights movement. There was a sense of foreboding.

In August, the first civil rights march had been blocked from entering Dungannon town centre because Rev. Ian Paisley’s supporters had occupied it. Clashes had broken out with the RUC when marchers refused to disperse. To avoid a repeat of Dungannon’s trouble, the organisers planned that if the RUC blocked the route, they would hold a protest meeting and disperse. There would be no tricolours (illegal under the Flags and Emblems Act 1954) and no republican placards (Sinn Féin was proscribed in 1956), only civil rights slogans. Republican activists were told to obey the directions of the civil rights leaders. 

Meharg, however, was under instructions from Home Affairs Minister William Craig. New water cannon and a newly trained riot squad from Belfast were secretly moved to Derry in preparation. On Duke Street, the civil rights marchers, all dressed in their weekend best, suddenly found themselves caught between lines of RUC officers, front and rear. Meharg ordered “The police will hold their hands, please” which seemed to be the signal to begin the attack. RUC officers snuck out batons from under their tunics and began hitting the shocked and passive marchers standing around. Fitt took a blow to the head and McAteer a heavy one to the groin. Both were hospitalized. The water canon were deployed. As the RUC rampaged – there is no other word – through the streets, the water-cannon hit the marchers and broke windows of homes and businesses. Craig, competing for leadership within the UUP and on the streets with Paisley, was determined to damn the civil rights movement as a republican-communist conspiracy to subvert the state through violence. Craig set the trap with Meharg the one to trip it.

In interviews afterwards, Craig insisted that the marchers had started the violence, directly contradicting the news footage that alarmed Irish audiences, shocked Westminster and Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and quickly spread around the world. Northern Ireland suddenly looked like Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas resisting de-segregation. Nothing in his career or comments suggested that Meharg ever grasped that he had also sprung a trap on the RUC itself. The spiral of confrontation between civil rights marchers and republicans with the RUC and loyalists eventually collapsed both the Stormont government and the power-sharing administration established by the Sunningdale communiqué.

Conflict demands the diametric. For unionists, RUC officers were an indomitable line of defence. The force’s royal designation, alone among British police services, and crown insignia stood for a cherished loyalty sanctified by loss. They also spoke to the Royal Irish Constabulary’s heritage in Ireland and abroad where it had influenced policing in the far corners of the British Empire. The Northwest Mounted Police of Canada, later the Mounties, were modelled on the Royal Irish Mounted Constabulary.

For nationalists and republicans, the RUC and the B Specials of the Ulster Special Constabulary were the sectarian cutting edge of the monolithic UUP running Stormont as a Protestant bastion since 1921. The draconian emergency Special Powers Act (arrest without warrant, detention without trial, home searches and power to ban public meetings), introduced to quell violent republican opposition to partition in 1922, had been made permanent in 1933. This was policing the Catholic portion of the population (around 35% and growing) by intimidation. After the deployment of the British Army in 1969, the conflict formalised into a paramilitary insurgency in the 1970s. The RUC were the designated lead in counter-insurgency. By the 1980s, RUC Special Branch were perforce aligned with the dark arts of the dirty war fought between the British Army and MI5 against the IRA. In between these morally blurred front lines were many police officers doing what they loved, serving their community as best and fairly as they could. It was the RUC’s fate to be seen as part of the problem and as ‘legitimate targets’ of the IRA.

In 1993 there was much talks of a peace process: Fr Alec Reid had shaped and encouraged the Hume-Adams dialogue, made public in April; the McGuinness-Mayhew channel operated by MI6 and exposed in November; Reynolds’ private channels to loyalist paramilitaries; and the Reynolds-Major dialogue. After the Reynolds-Major summit on December 3rd there was heighted expectation of a political breakthrough, leading to an IRA cessation of operations.

Just after 1 a.m. on December 12th Jean Beacom had put her son to bed and was going to lock up the family restaurant in Fivemiletown (not far from Enniskillen), County Tyrone. She heard gunshots and rushed into the street. She was one of the first on the scene of an IRA ambush. Her husband, RUC Constable Drew (46), and RUC full-time reserve Constable Ernest Smith (49) were dead after a volley of 20 shots hit their unmarked Renault 21. The vivid image of her dead husband would never leave her. Drew Beacom, father of 3, and Ernest Smith, father of 2 with an ailing wife, were community police officers and locally popular. They were part of a handful of RUC officers killed among the eighty-eight conflict related fatalities that year. Talk of peace rang hollow in the normally peaceful town and surrounding Clogher valley. Three days later, the Downing Street Declaration was announced.

The Downing Street Declaration is one of the great documents of Irish history. The language of the Declaration, crafted in the main by DFA’s Seán O’ hUiginn, reached beyond its time and circumstance in a mix of enticements that spoke to current political realities, high principles, and a future of harmony that recalled the highest aspirations of Irish nationalism. Its formulation of self-determination consistent with partition and other commitments were the foundation for the cessation of violence the following August. The clarion call to heal division and accommodate both identities through trust, respect for democratic values, and mutual respect acted as a template for future documents, its language and ambition reworked like a symphonic refrain, resounding eventually in the Good Friday Agreement.

A trade off had been agreed before I travelled to join the Irish government’s Talks Team at Castle Complex in April 1998. There would be a full international commission on either policing or the administration of justice but not both, the head of our team told me. As the official DFA lead, Dermot Gallagher did not give me any instructions as I reviewed the draft texts on policing, justice, and security normalisation worked out between officials of the Irish Department of Justice and the NIO. There was little to be gained by re-opening the draft language almost finalised by officials on justice and normalisation. The draft terms of reference for a policing commission were alarmingly weak. Negotiations needed to be re-opened.

The SDLP’s lead on policing, Seamus Mallon and Alex Attwood, reviewed the draft text on policing.  Like a disapproving teacher correcting homework, Mallon quietly exhaled ‘no’ and ‘no’ more in disappointment than anger. At the heart of the negotiation that followed, the NIO and I word-wrangled between creating a police accountable to the whole community and an effective police. The purpose of this creative tension was to convert what was a police force into a police service by ensuring its composition and ethos reflected the society it served. I expected a push-back on the text when the UUP examined the text but none came. The drama of those final days and hours of negotiation were consumed by North-South arrangements and weapons decommissioning.

Unionists protested the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing published in 1999. Chris Patten, the chair, told them to read the terms of reference. The real work formulating new policing had been done in the public meetings they had done throughout Northern Ireland. Yet terms of reference matter. Members of a commission resolve differences by reverting to them for guidance. It is a measure of Patten and his courageous, visionary commission members that they reached for the ambitions set out in the Good Friday Agreement. That their comprehensive recommendations created a new beginning in policing reflected the commission’s objective to give Northern Ireland’s peace a long-term foundation. Politics could roil about but fair, representative policing was the key to social order and stability: lose public confidence in the police and you lose the peace.

Implementing the recommendations was a critical process. Over coffee in a diner, I discussed the role of Patten Oversight Commissioner with Tom Constantine, veteran of the New York State Police and Drug Enforcement Agency. He agreed to take on the role. He and his chief staffer Mark Reber, served well the cause of peace by ensuring the recommendations were implemented not just on paper but in practice. New policing was served well too by the honourable within the NIO, high-minded public servants like Robin Masefield. From my subsequent experience as director of DFA’s Conflict Resolution Unit, I learned that post-conflict security sector reform is often the most problematic exercise in peace building. I can say with conviction that Northern Ireland managed it better than most. With the passage of thirty years, the trick is to sustain that achievement.

Policing is where the power of the state to use restraint, confinement, and violence meets the citizen. The social contract of the modern nation state means yielding the moral monopoly of violence to the forces of law and order; domestically to the police and internationally to the army. Lincoln’s famous adage of good government applies with particular force to policing: of the people, by the people, and for the people. Where governments must win the consent of the governed, the police must have the consent of the policed.

The great achievement of policing reform in Northern Ireland has been its conversion from a force engaged in counter-terrorism to a police serving the public but still capable of managing dreadful eruptions of public disorder as well as dealing with dissident republicans and wayward loyalists. As it was during the drafting of the commission terms of reference, composition and ethos remain the crucial issue. The composition and ethos of the police must reflect the society it polices if it is to retain the consent of the policed. That consent gives the police the acceptance and moral authority to use their powers to restrain and confine, and violence when needed, without precipitating a political crisis.

Policing is responsible for maintaining public and social order but not the conditions that create or undermine it. It rests on governments to provide those conditions. Failures can manifest in many ways: extreme poverty, marginalisation, inequality, erosion of public services, lack of education and opportunity, hyperinflation, discrimination, denial of human rights, draconian restrictions on freedom and privacy, insults to personal dignity, to name some. Predicting the future of policing in Northern Ireland requires a prediction of its future social and political improvements or ills, some of which will be traced to decisions already made, some made now, and some in the future by governments. Policing reform and the PSNI in Northern Ireland have provided a service that enabled power-sharing government to form, break-down, and reform in frequent cycles. It is up to those responsible for government in Northern Ireland to provide the conditions for public and social order that minimises the challenges facing policing over the next thirty years.

Should Irish unity ever come about, one challenge facing an all-island police force is winning the consent of the policed and in particular of those who voted against unity and lost. The high principles and ambitions of the Downing Street Declaration and Good Friday Agreement will be the yardsticks of success: specifically, the commitment to exercise power “with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all of the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions… founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedoms from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities”. A united Ireland so governed will secure the consent of the governed and of the policed.


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